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that it is a vital remedy if our legal system is to continue its use of in-
junctions. The substantive requirements applied by the courts set out a
system of self-imposed restraints which greatly limit the use of the power
and serve as a check against misuse of criminal contempt. Therefore,
in ordinary times, the substantive controls seem adequate. The great
danger lies in the use of the power to enforce some great social policy,
the justice of which most men cannot fail to agree upon. Such a policy
is desegregation. With an issue of such compelling national importance,
there is a possibility that the judges, in their anxiety to bring about racial
equality, will relax some of the controls.73 This might result in injustice
to some persons who are against the desegregation policy and perhaps
some who are merely victims of circumstances, caught between two
powerful forces. Many of the southern school authorities fall within
the last category.74 They are faced with strong local pressures on one
hand and the power of the federal courts on the other. Even those who
honestly wish to comply with the desegregation orders will have diffi-
culty. As to those who resist desegregation, while most cannot agree
with them, it is still highly desirable that they be afforded their full legal
rights. Therefore, the courts should exercise even greater caution in the
use of the contempt power, and because the procedural protections are
fewer, make certain that the substantive requirements are met.
MALPRACTICE AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Statutes of Limitation are said to serve the dual purpose of protect-
ing defendants against the evidentiary difficulties inherent in litigating
stale claims1 and providing for security of transactions with the passage
of time.2 In negligence cases, the stale claims policy consideration is
particularly cogent in view of the perishable nature of evidence usually
involved.' Thus, the shorter statutory period for actions to recover
73. This was not the case in In re Kasper, No. 1555 (E.D. Tenn. 1956). The de-
fendant was enjoined from interfering with the execution of a previously issued de-
segregation order. The restraining order was served on Kasper while he was making
a speech. He ignored the order and continued the speech in which he urged resistance
to the desegragation order. The court found this conduct amounted to inciting others
to violence and held the defendant guilty of criminal contempt.
74. See Hoxie School Dist. v. Brewer, 135 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Ark. 1955), where
the school board sought to enjoin persons who were interfering with the board's at-
tempt to comply with a desegregation order.
1. See WOOD, LIMITATION OF AcTioNs § 5 (1st ed. 1882).
2. See Patterson, Can Law Be Scientificf, 25 ILL. L. REv. 121 at 144 (1930) ; Mar-
shall v. Watkins, 106 Ind. App. 235, 18 N.E.2d 954.
3. See Note, 28 CoNN. B. J. 346, 348.
NOTES
damages for personal injuries, including malpractice, not only facilitates
determination of the validity of the claim, but allegedly aids in a more
accurate evaluation of the extent of injuries.4 While the basic policy
considerations are no longer a matter of controversy, administration of
such policy by the courts is a protean and dynamic area of the law.
At a very early period the courts did not share the enthusiasm of
the legislature for the statute of limitations: it was considered an un-
conscionsable defense, strictly construed against the party seeking to
bring himself within the statute's provisions.' After the courts came to
consider such statutes beneficial, it was generally recognized that in-
flexible application would result in the sacrifice of legitimate claims
along with the spurious, and numerous exceptions were always implied.6
Limitations applicable to malpractice suits presented a singular exception
to the general lenient attitude, however, and it is only since the early
'30's that devices used for removing the statutory bar in other cases have
been employed extensively in malpractice actions.9
A recent decision of the Indiana Supreme Court illustrates the prob-
lems encountered in this area."0 The plaintiff Guy alleged that during a
three year course of treatment for a fractured leg, the defendant physi-
cian negligently failed to remove a piece of drill broken during an opera-
tion on the defendant and negligently failed to inform the plaintiff of the
presence of the metal which was not discovered until eleven years after
the physician-patient relationship was terminated. The trial court sus-
tained the defendant's demurrer on the grounds that the plaintiff's claim
was barred by the two year statute of limitations for malpractice. Al-
though the Supreme Court held that the statute, absolute on its face, was
4. See Howard v. Middlesborough Hospital, 242 Ky. 602, 611, 47 S.W.2d 77, 81
(1932) ; Nightlinger v. Johnson, 18 Pa. D. & C. 47, 48 (1932) But see Developments
in the Law--Statutes of Lhnitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1203 (1950); Dawson,
Fraudulent Conceahment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH. L. REv. 875, 903 & n. 80
(1933). The difficulty of proving prospective damages in malpractice cases is said to
be one of the greatest hardships resulting from inflexible application of limitation
statutes.
5. See cases cited in WooD, LImITATION OF AcTIONs 6, n. 1. One of the early Amer-
ican codes of professional ethics contained the following resolution: "I will never plead
the Statute of Limitations when based on the mere ef flux of time; for if my client is
conscious he owes the debt, and has no other defense than the legal bar, he shall never
make me a partner in his knavery." Resolution XII, Hoffman's Fifty Resolutions in
Rcgard to Professional Deportment, in 31 REPORTS OF AmEPIcAN BAR Ass'N 71 (1907).
The modern view, however, is that such defenses are deliberately offered by the law,
and it is the client's privilege to avail himself of them. See DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS
149 (1953).
6. Dawson, supra note 4, n. 3 at 876.
9. One writer has speculated that the hostility of lawyers towards actions for mal-
practice may be traced to the "solidarity of two professional castes which are equally
exposed to the criticism and dislike of laymen." Dawson, supra note 4, at 902.
10. Guy v. Schuldt, 138 N.E.2d 891 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1956).
529
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not governed by an 1881 statute providing an exception for fraudulent
concealment, the court nevertheless reversed the trial court on the grounds
that fraudulent concealment, independent of any statutory exception,
would toll the statute of limitations. The holding in Guy v. Schuldt is,
of course, very narrow. Specifically, it was held that since fraudulent
concealment is an exception to the malpractice statute of limitations, the
complaint is not demurrable because the plaintiff must be allowed an
opportunity to plead the exception by way of reply. The court did not
need to determine the nature of the fraudulent concealment required to
toll the statute, nor did it necessarily restrict itself as to other possible
techniques for preventing the running of the limitation.
The general problems suggested by Guy v. Schuldt have been fre-
quently litigated in other jurisdictions, and several methods for suspend-
ing the operation of the limitation have been evolved. One line of deci-
sions has been primarily concerned with the facts giving rise to the cause
of action, with a view towards determining when the statute begins to
run and what statute is applicable. Cases involving the so-called "con-
tract," "continuing negligence," and "discovery" doctrines are involved
here. Another line of cases emphasizes facts other than those giving rise
to the original cause of action which may postpone the running of the
statute, even though the cause of action, itself, may already be said to
have accrued. The majority of these cases involve "fraudulent conceal-
ment" by the defendant. As will be seen, these categories are neither
always distinct nor mutually exclusive, but they do provide a convenient
dichotomy for the purposes of case analysis.
It has frequently been held in states following the first line of deci-
sions that the physician-patient relationship is contractual in nature, and
a few jurisdictions allow the plaintiff to sue for breach of contract
where the cause of action would otherwise be barred by the shorter limi-
tation on actions to recover damages for personal injury.1' A more
significant ramification of the contractual nature of the relationship is
the confusion which it creates as to when a cause of action accrues. 2
The usual tort rule is that an action for negligence requires allegation
and proof of actual injury, and the statute of limitations does not begin
to run until the injury has been sustained." Contrasted to this is the
11. Sellers v. Noah, 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; Stokes v. Wright,
20 Ga. App. 325, 93 S.E. 27 (1911). Where the action is in contract the general rule
is no recovery for disability, pain or suffering. See, e.g., Franklel v. Walper, 181 App.
Div. 547 (1918).
12. See generally Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L.
REv. 1177, 1201.
13. Wabash County v. Pearson, 120 Ind. 426, 22 N.E. 134 (1889) (period measured
from collapse of bridge rather than from negligent construction) ; White v. Schnoebelen,
NOT".S
rule in contract actions that the statute begins to run from the breach of
duty when an action for nominal damages could be sustained.' 4 Although
in the majority of jurisdictions malpractice has been characterized as an
action sounding in tort and not contract, the statute has been held to run
from the time of the negligent act, regardless of when actual damage was
sustained.'" This failure to distinguish between technical breach of con-
tract and recovery of compensable damages for negligence may result in
the anomaly of a plaintiff's action for negligence against a physician be-
ing barred before it could be feasibly maintained."8 It is important here
to distinguish situations where the plaintiff seeks to postpone the running
of the statute on the grounds of ignorance of the full extent of damages.
Although sound tort law should require the statutory period to run from
the date actual injury results from the defendant's negligent conduct, it
is clearly improper to postpone commencement of the period until matura-
tion of all the harm.' It has been suggested that placing the burden on
the plaintiff to prove that damages for actual injury were first recover-
able within the statutory period immediately preceding suit would protect
defendants from abuse of such a rule.'
The contractual nature of the physician-patient relationship forms
the basis of the "continuing negligence" theory which in certain situa-
tions may be employed to toll the statute. 9 In Gillette v. Tucker, the
first malpractice case to recognize the theory, the defendant physician
who failed to remove a sponge from the plaintiff during an operation
91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941) (period commences when lightning causes damage
rather than from negligent installation of lightning rod.) Contra, Wilcox v. Plummer,
4 Pet. 172 (U.S. 1830) (period held to run from time of attorney's negligent act rather
than from date of damage).
14. See e.g., Pennsylvania Company v. Good, 56 Ind. App. 562, 103 N.E. 672 (1913).
15. "Any act of misconduct or negligence on his (physiciafs) part in the service
undertaken was a breach of his contract, which gave rise to a right of action in contract
or tort, and the statutory period began to run at that time, and not when the actual
damage results. . . . The damage sustained by the wrong done is not the cause of ac-
tion. . . . Cappucci v. Barone, 226 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653, 654 (1919). See also
Wernstein v. Blanchard, 109 N.J.L. 332, 162 Atl. 601 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932). The
other rule has been recognized, however: "Where . . . the cause of action is based on
consequential as distinguished from direct damages, and involves an act or omission
which might have proved harmless, the cause of action must be taken as accruing only
upon the actual occurrence of damage so that the statute runs only from that time."
Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 Atl. 83, 85 (1917) ; cf. Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D.
418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947) (limitation on husband's action for loss of wife's services
resulting from injuries to her caused by defendant's malpratcice runs from date of
injury).
16. In Weinstein v. Blanchard, supra note 15, the court admitted that no actual
damage was sustained until 19 years after the defendant physician failed to- remove a
rubber drainage sponge, but still denied recovery.
17. When some actual damage occurs the plaintiff can of course recover for
prospective damages. See McCORmIcx, DAMAGES § 26 (1935).
18. See Developments in the Law, supra note 12 at 1202.
19. 67 Ohio Op. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
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had continued to treat the plaintiff until eight months prior to the suit.
Although the operation had occurred beyond the statutory period, the
court held that the action was not barred. The court reasoned that since
the physician's contractual duty was to successfully complete the opera-
tion, failure to remove the sponge constituted continuous negligent con-
duct during the entire course of treatment.2" In subsequent cases the
language of Gillette v. Tucker was used to sustain the sweeping proposi-
tion that the statute of limitations never begins to run until termination
of treatment. 1 The better rule as announced in more recent decisions
would seem to be that the limitation should run from the date of the
last negligent treatment.22 In cases where the surgeon leaves a foreign
substance inside the patient, the two rules would reach the same result,
but where irreparable harm results from a single act, such as a negligently
administered blood transfusion or X-ray treatment, the continuing at-
tendance of the physician has no causal relation to the harm,2" and the
statute should run from the date of the last negligent act regardless of
whether this coincides with termination of treatment.24
Although the general rule is that knowledge of the injury by the
plaintiff is not a factor in determining when the statutory period com-
mences,2" there is some authority for a contrary rule. In the field of
20. The theory of continuing tort has also been applied to a failure to properly
diagnose. Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941). The doctrine of
Gillette v. Tucker was repudiated by the Ohio court in McArthur v. Bowers, 72 Ohio
Op. 656, 76 N.E. 1128 (Sup. Ct. 1905), but was later reaffirmed in Bowers v. Santee,
99 Ohio Op. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
21. See e.g., Schmitt v. Esser, 178 Minn. 82, 226 N.W. 196 (1929) (negligent setting
of broken leg), where the court quoted with approval the following policy argument
from Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio Op. 361, 363, 124 N.E. 238, 240 (Sup. Ct. 1919) : "More-
over, it is clearly just to the surgeon that he be not harassed by any premature litigation
instituted in order to save the right of the patient in the event that there be substantial
malpractice. The surgeon should have all reasonable time and opportunity to correct
the evils which made the operation or treatment necessary, and even reasonable time and
opportunity to corrct the ordinary and usual mistakes incident to even skilled surgery."
In these cases "termination of treatment" does not necessarily mean formal discharge.
The physician need only have ceased to treat as to the particular injury or malady in
question. Schmitt v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931).
22. Nervick v. Fine, 195 Misc. 465, 87 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (limitation
runs from date of last negligent act which is a question of fact for the jury).
23. McCoy v. Stevens, 182 Wash. 54, 44 P.2d 797 (1935) (X-ray burns) ; Giambozi
v. Peters, 127 Conn. 380, 16 A.2d 833 (1940). "The term malpractice itself may be
applied to a single act of a physician or surgeon or, again, to a course of treatment. The
statute of limitations begins to run when the breach of duty occurs . . . [if] the injury
is complete at the time of the act, the statutory period commences to run at that time.
When, however, the injurious consequences arise from a course of treatment, the statute
does not begin to run until the treatment is terminated." Giambozi v. Peters supra at
56, 16 A.2d 835.
24. Gangloff v. Appelbach 319 II1. App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 795 (1943) (negligent set-
ting of fractured arm) ; Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 77 A.2d 240 (1950) (statute
runs from date of last unsuccessful operation by plastic surgeon).
25. Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917) (X-ray burns); Conklin v.
NOTES
occupational diseases it has been held that the limitation should run from
the date when the plaintiff might reasonably have discovered his injury,
where a certain type of injury, termed by Justice Rutledge "inherently
unknowable," is involved.26 In Missouri this rule has been statutorily
adopted for all negligence actions,2" and Louisiana follows the civil law
maxium, Contra iton volentem agere iton volet praescriptio (Prescription
does not run against him who is unable to sue) .28 The California courts
have drawn on the theory of continuing negligence and an analogy be-
tween malpractice and workman's compensation cases to develop the rule
that the statute runs from the date when the plaintiff discovered or
should have discovered his injury. At first the rule was thought to ap-
ply only to foreign substance cases, but now it is held to apply to all types
of malpractice actions. -9
Of all the theories used to toll the statute of limitations in order that
the plaintiff may have a practical remedy, the discovery rule is the most
unique. The only area outside of occupational disease where it has found
any general judicial acceptance is in actions for interference with the
Draper, 229 App. Div. 227 (1930) (affirmed without opinion 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E.
892) (1930) (forceps left in abdominal cavity after operation).
26. In Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1948), the plaintiff had contracted silicosis
because of inhalation of silica dust over a 30 year period. J. Rutledge, in disposing
of the contention that the action was barred because the plaintiff must have contracted
the disease many years prior to suit, said: "If Urie were held barred . . . it would
be clear that the federal legislation afforded only a delusive remedy. It would mean
that at some past moment in time, unknown and inherently unknowable even in retro-
spect Urie was charged with knowledge of the slow & tragic disintegration of his
lungs. We do not think the humane legislative plan intended such consequences to at-
tach to blameless ignorance. Nor can [they] be reconciled with the traditional purposes
of statutes of limitations. . . ." Uric v. Thompson, supra at 169.
27. ". . . the cause of action shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is
done or the technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting
therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment, and, if more than one item of
damage, then the last item, so that all resulting damage may be recovered, and full and
complete relief obtained." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.100 (1952).
28. See McKnight v. Calhoun, 36 La. Ann. 408, 1 So. 612 (1884) ; Perrin v. Rodri-
guez, 153 So. 555 (1934).
29. Prior to 1936 the California courts had consistently declined to use any technique
to toll the statute of limitations in malpractice actions. See e.g., Gum v. Allen, 119 Cal.
App. 293, 6 P.2d 311 (1931) ; Johnson v. Nolan, 105 Cal. App. 293, 288 Pac. 78 (1930).
The origin of the discovery doctrine may be traced to Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. App. 2d
302, 57 P.2d 908 (App. Dep't 1936) (failure to remove drainage tube) where the court
applied the discovery rule of workmen's compensation cases, although that case was ap-
parently decided on the mutually independent ground of continuing negligence. For a
while the discovery rule was apparently thought to be applicable only in cases involving
continuing negligence, Petrucci v. Heidenreich, 43 Cal. App.2d 561, 111 P.2d 421 (1941)
(improperly performed cervical cauterization), or failure to remove a foreign substance.
Ehlen v. Burrows, 51 Cal. App. 2d 141, 124 P.2d 82 (1942) (failure of dentist to remove
roots of decayed teeth). Since 1947 the discovery doctrine has been applied to all types
of malpractice cases without qualification. Greninger v. Fischer, 81 Cal. App. 2d 544,
184 P.2d 694 (1947) (improper diagnosis); Costra v. Regents of University of Cali-
fornia, 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (1953) (negligent treatment).
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right of subjacent support. This result is reached because the gravamen
of the action is considered injury to the surface of the land and the in-
jury is therefore not said to have occurred until it becomes apparent."
In many instances application of the discovery rule in malpractice cases
represents a similar judcial recognition that an action for negligence does
not exist, even theoretically, until an injury is sustained.3 In other
situations the fraudulent concealment exception will produce the same
result. 2 It must be recognized, however, that there are situations where
the plaintiff's blameless ignorance of his cause of action can be traced
to neither delayed harm nor fraudulent concealment.33 In this penumbra
the equities involved must be closely examined. The very uniqueness
of the discovery rule in view of its apparent fairness and simplicity of
application is in itself a caveat. The general rule that knowledge of
the harm is immaterial in determining when the limitation begins to run
is based on the assumption that in most cases a diligent plaintiff will be
aware of the injury within the statutory period.3 4 In many malpractice
cases such an assumption is probably fallacious. Patients will frequently
experience difficulty in distinguishing between injuries arising out of
malpractice and those disabilities which are a normal incident of the in-
jury or malady giving rise to treatment.3" Certainly the term "inherently
unknowable" is a fair description of cases where a foreign substance is
negligently left in a patient's body, and it is submitted that extending the
discovery doctrine to cover such cases is clearly warranted. The injus-
tice of denying to this class of plaintiffs any practical relief seems great
enough to justify subordination of the policy considerations behind an
absolute limitation.36
30. West Pratt Coal Co. v. Dorman, 161 Ala. 389, 49 So. 849 (1909) ; Rector, War-
dens, & Vestrymen of the Church of the Holy Communion v. Paterson Ext. R.R., 66
N.J.L. 218, 49 At. 1031 (1901). Contra, Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, 50 Atd. 255
(1901). See note 13 supra.
31. See Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. App.2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
32. See infra, note 40.
33. This is especially true if knowledge of the malpractice by the physician is
deemed essential to invocation of the fraudulent concealment exception. See infra, note
54. Malpractice cases involving internal injuries arising out of negligent X-ray treat-
ments furnish another good example. See, e.g., Becker v. Floersch, 153 Kan. 374, 110
P.2d 752 (1941) ; Wilder v. Haworth, 187 Ore. 688, 213 P.2d 797 (1949).
34. See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177,
1203 (1950).
35. See Schmitt v. Esser, 178 Minn. 82, 226 N.W. 196 (1929).
36. Placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the first time he could have
reasonably discovered the injury was within the statutory period immediately preceding
the suit, would minimize the danger of fraud. The California courts have placed a
higher duty of diligence on the plaintiff to discover his injury after the physician-
patient relationship has terminated. While the relationship continues the patient has
a right to rely on the duty of the physician to make full disclosure, and need not
make any independent effort to ascertain the existence of his cause of action. Stafford
NOTES
In the second line of malpractice cases, emphasizing acts subsequent
to the original cause of the action, the major source of confusion has
arisen from the indiscriminate use of the word "fraud." The first dis-
tinction which must be made is between "undiscovered fraud" and
"fraudulent concealment."'" The former term is properly applicable only
when the act giving rise to the original cause of action constitutes fraud
as opposed to an act of negligence.38 A deliberate misrepresentation as
to the existence of a disease for the purpose of inducing the patient to
submit to expensive treatments would therefore give rise to an action
for fraud rather than negligence, and exemplary damages would be re-
coverable.3" To come under the fraudulent concealment exception, the
act of negligence giving rise to the cause of action must be accompanied
by some further act of concealment preventing the plaintiff's discovery
of a cause of action.4" In either case, the running of the limitation is
postponed until the patient discovered, or exercising reasonable diligence
might have discovered the injury; but where fraudulent concealment is
involved, the negligence or personal injury statute of limitations is ap-
plicable, 4 and where undiscovered fraud is involved, the longer fraud
statute should be applied.42 In certain jurisdictions where the exception
for fraudulent concealment is not recognized, this distinction is ignored,
and the subsequent concealment is held to give rise to a separate action
for fraud.4" In Alabama, on the other hand, a statute which postpones
running of the limitation in causes of action grounded in fraud has been
interpreted to apply to fraudulent concealment of a legal cause of action ;44
and a Georgia statute, which provides that fraud will toll all limitations,
has been applied exactly as fraudulent concealment statutes in other
jurisdictions.4
v. Shultz, 42 Cal.2d 767, 270 P.2d 1 (1954) (negligent treatment of injured leg neces-
sitating subsequent amputation). In this respect the discovery rule is similar to the
fraudulent concealment doctrine. See htfra, note 52.
37. For a general discussion see Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes of Lind-
tation, 31 MIcH. L. REv. 591, and, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation,
31 Micr. L. Rzv. 875.
38. See Graham v. Upegraph, 144 Kan. 45, 49, 58 P.2d 475, 479 (1936) ; Swankow-
ski v. Diethelm, 98 Ohio App. 21, 129 N.E.2d 182 (1953).
39. Mc. Burney v. Daughety, 195 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
40. Thompson v. Barnard, 142 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Here the court
emphasizes that the fraudulent concealment exception is really a recognition of the
theory of equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais to prevent fraudulent or inequitable
resort to a plea of limitations. See also Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791 (Ky.'Ct. of
App. 1952) (failure to remove rubber drainage tube).
41. Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 235 N.W. 633 (1931) (implied exception).
42. Mc. Burney v. Daughtey, 19 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
43. Krestich v. Stefanez, 243 Wis. 1, 9 N.W.2d 130 (1943) (failure to remove
surgical needles).
44. Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147 (1940) (failure to remove sponge).
45. Saffold v. Scarborough, 91 Ga. App. 628, 86 S.E. 649 (1955) (excessive radium
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The distinction between legal and equitable actions which strongly
influenced the early development of the undiscovered fraud exception
has been generally ignored by courts applying the fraudulent concealment
exception. The early cases treated concealment by the defendant as an
inherent bar to a plea of the statute of limitations which was grounded
in morality and justice, and only in New Jersey has the exception taken
the form of a separate bill in equity enjoining a plea of the statute at
law.4" Today the exception is recognized either by statute or judicial
decision in over half the states." Unfortunately, judicial acceptance of
the fraudulent concealment exception in malpractice cases has only re-
cently been achieved." In early cases a strict adherence to a requirement
of affirmative misrepresentations as to the existence of an injury pre-
cluded relief in situations where the physician utilized his most effective
weapon of concealment: that of mere silence." Only affirmative con-
duct, it was thought, involved that degree of moral turpitude deemed es-
sential to invocation of the doctrine. 0 Later cases have abandoned the
requirement of affirmative conduct, and it is now generally held that the
fiduciary relationship between physician and patient imposes a duty of
disclosure, breach of which constitutes fraudulent concealment."' The
fiduciary relationship is also relied on to excuse the plaintiff from mak-
ing any independent effort to ascertain the extent or existence of an
injury as long as he remains in the defendant's care. 2 The question of
exactly what must be concealed before the exception applies is in need
of clarification. This is especially true where the concealment goes only
to the seriousness rather than the existence of an injury, and in border-
line cases the problem is further confused by the question of whether or
not the plaintiff should have been put on inquiry notice as to the ex-
istence of his injury."
treatment) ; Tabar v. Clifton, 63 Ga. App. 788, 12 S.E.2d 137 (1940) (physician going
beyond authority in operation).
46. See Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MIcH. L.
REV. 875, n. 4. But cf. Guy v. Schuldt, 138 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1956).
47. Cases collected by Dawson, supra note 46, at 877 n. 5, 6.
48. The first unequivocal application of fraudulent concealment to a malpractice
action appears to be Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 235 N.W. 633 (1931).
49. Cappucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1919) ; De Hann v. Winter,
258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932) (statute was tolled on alternative ground of con-
tinuing negligence).
50. Picket v. Aglinsky, 110 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940) (applying W. Va. law)
(failure to remove surgical sponge).
51. See e.g., Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147 (1940) (failure to remove
surgical sponge) ; Tabar v. Clifton, 63 Ga. App. 768, 12 S.E.2d 137 (1940).
52. Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948) (failure to remove piece
of drill broken during extraction of impacted wisdom tooth) ; Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d
791 (Ky Ct. of App. 1952) (failure to remove drainage tube).
53. See Bowman v. McPheeters, 77 Cal. App.2d 795, 176 P.2d 745 (1947) ; Ogg v.
Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917) ; Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791 (Ky Ct.
NOTES
The unhappy distinction drawn between affirmative conduct and
silence was only one aspect of a problem which continues to bother the
courts. If scienter is an essential element of the fraudulent concealment
exception, then allegation and proof that the defendant's silence was ac-
companied by knowledge that he had committed an act of malpractice
would be necessary, and most courts have so held.54 The proposition
has not gone unchallenged, however. In Arizona the nebulous phrase,
"constructive fraud," has been invoked to dismiss the necessity of scien-
ter.5 Perhaps the most forthright repudiation of scienter as an element
of fraudulent concealment in malpractice cases is to be found in a Colo-
rado decision where the court said that the doctrine should be applied in
any situation where the defendant's negligent act is concealed from the
plaintiff, regardless how innocently."6 What these jurisdictions have
actually done, of course, is to achieve the result of a discovery doctrine by
a more devious route. When the traditional fraudulent concealment ex-
ception is stripped of the element of scienter, only the plaintiff's blame-
less ignorance remains as a justification for tolling the statute. The
indirect approach to liberalization of statutes of limitation will probably
be typical of future litigation in this area. Whereas the discovery doc-
trine represents a distinct innovation in statute of limitation law made
possible by unique circumstances in three states,"7 the fraud and estoppel
doctrines are familiar concepts in all jurisdictions. If the present trend
away from strict application of limitations in malpractice suits continues,
the very adaptability of such concepts will recommend them to the
courts."8
An appraisal of the Indiana statute"5 with a view towards anticipat-
of App. 1952) ; Hudson v. Shoulders, 45 S.W.2d 1072 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1932).
54. Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147 (1940); Silvertooth v. Shallen-
berger, 49 Ga. App. 133, 174 S.E. 365 (1934) ; Brown v. Grinstead, 212 Mo. App. 533,
252 S.W. 973 (1923) (applying Ill law) ; Murray v. Allen, 103 Vt. 373, 154 Atl. 678
(1931).
55. Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948). The court reasoned that
the defendant physician, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known
that his instrument had broken off during the operation, and since good medical practice
would require him to take X-rays to locate the broken drill and remove it, the failure to
notify the plaintiff of his omission constituted a "constructive fraud" regardless of
"moral guilt" or the intent to defraud. Cf. Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. Ct. of
App. 1952).
56. Rosane v. Singer, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
57. See notes 27, 28, 29 supra.
58. The trend towards liberalization of the limitation is not apparent in all juris-
dictions. An Oregon case has expressly rejected the discovery doctrine of California
in favor of strict application. Wilder v. Haworth, 187 Ore. 688, 213 P.2d 797 (1949),
and even the more common theory of continuihig negligence has been rejected in a
recent Washington decision. Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash.2d 675, 277 P.2d 724 (1954).
59. "No action of any kind for damages, whether brought in contract or tort, based
upon professional services rendered or which should have been rendered, shall be
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ing future developments in light of the Schuldt case reveals peculiar
wording which should preclude the application of several of the pre-
viously discussed doctrines. In the majority of jurisdictions the limita-
tion runs from the time the "cause of action accrues."6  Thus, the
courts, by interpreting the word "accrual," might postpone commence-
ment of the period until maturation of an injury in cases where the de-
fendant's act or omission and the harm will not naturally coincide.6 The
Indiana malpractice statute, by requiring that the period run from the
date of the "act, omission, or neglect complained of," precludes this pos-
sibility, and it may be noted that this coerced result is inconsistent with
results reached under other Indiana limitation statutes. 62
The theory of continuing negligence remains a possibility. In cases
where the plaintiff's injury is traceable to no single negligent act, but
rather is attributable to the negligent treatment taken as a whole, there
should be little doubt as to the applicability of the doctrine. In foreign
substance cases a harder question is presented. By a strict construction
of the words "act or omission" to mean only the original failure to re-
move, application of the theory might be precluded, but the additional
phrase "or neglect complained of" could easily beconstrued to embrace a
continuous neglect to remove, and the statute would run from termina-
tion of the duty to remove at the end of the treatment. In any event, the
continuing negligence theory will not aid plaintiffs in situations similar
to the Schiddt case where discovery of the injury occurs long after ter-
mination of the physician-patient relationship.
In such cases the theory of fraudulent concealment which was dis-
cussed by the Indiana Supreme Court in the Schuldt case would be the
plaintiff's only alternative. Unfortunately, there is dicta in the Schuldt
case which indicates that the fraudulent concealment exception may be
given a rather unique interpretation in future Indiana cases. The court,
after indicating that silence, because of the fiduciary relationship be-
tween physician and patient, may be sufficient to constitute concealment,
goes on to say that in such cases the concealment ends and the statute
begins to run at the termination of the physician-patient relationship. 3
Such an unusual interpretation of the fraudulent concealment exception
brought, commenced or maintained, in any of the courts of this state against physicians,
dentists, surgeons, hospitals, sanitariums, or others, unless said action is filed within
two [2] years from the date of the act, omission or neglect complained of." IND. ANN.
STAT. § 2-627 (1946).
60. E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 614.1 (1955); MIcH. Co ap. LAWS § 609.13 (1948);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-208 (1943).
61. See note 15 supra.
62. See note 13 supra.
63. Guy v. Schuldt, 138 N.E.2d 891, 895 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1956).
NOTES
indicates that the court may have confused it with the exception for un-
discovered fraud. In Indiana, which has no undiscovered fraud excep-
tion, the statutory fraudulent concealment exception64 has been applied
to actions for fraud, but the decisions emphasize that fraud which is
sufficient to give the complaining party a cause of action may not also
be sufficient to serve as concealment.6" In states where an independent
undiscovered fraud exception is recognized by statute,66 no additional
concealment is necessary to make the statute run from discovery and if a
fiduciary relationship is involved, the plaintiff may be excused from the
duty to investigate or discover the fraud as long as the relationship ex-
ists.6" Thus, as a question of fact it may often be determined that the
plaintiff, at the termination of the fiduciary relationship, had informa-
tion available which should have enabled him to discover the fraud, and
the statute will begin to run. Where the original cause of action is based
on negligence the mechanics of applying the fraudulent concealment ex-
ception will be different, since in an action for malpractice the fiduciary
relationship serves a dual function. First, it creates a duty of disclosure
which makes silence fraudulent concealment.6" It also relieves the patient
from any duty to independently ascertain the existence of an injury.69
This right to rely may quite properly be said to end with the termination
of the relationship,"' but this should not mean, as a matter of law, that
the plaintiff's injury is no longer effectively concealed from him. If a
plaintiff who exercises all possible diligence is still unable to ascertain his
injury because of information wrongfully withheld by the physician,
under the theory of fraudulent concealment as applied in other jurisdic-
tions, the statutory period would not commence. The question of when
the plaintiff discovered, or exercising reasonable diligence should have
discovered, his injury after concealment by the defendant, should be a
question of fact determinable from the particular circumstances of each
case.
7
1
64. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-609 (1946):
"If any person liable to an action shall conceal the fact from the knowledge of the
person entitled thereto, the action may be commenced at any time within the period of
the limitation after the discovery of the cause of action."
65. Jackson v. Jackson, 149 Ind. 238, 47 N.E. 963 (1897).
66. See e.g., ARIz. CODE ANN. § 12-543-(3) (1956):
"For relief on the ground of fraud or mistake, which cause of action shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts consti-
tuting the fraud or mistake."
67. See e.g., Heap v. Heap, 258 Mich. 250, 242 N.W. 252 (1932) ; McDonald v. Mc-
Dougall, 86 Wash. 339, 150 Pac. 625 (1915).
68. See note 51 supra.
69. See note 52 supra.
70. Compare note 36 szupra.
71. See Acton v. Morrison, 62 Ariz. 139, 155 P.2d 784 (1945); Crossett Health
Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953) ; Breedlove v. Aiken, 85 Ga.
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As to whether the Indiana court will go very far towards eliminat-
ing the element of scienter by the use of constructive fraud or estoppel is
a matter of pure conjecture. The element of culpable wrongdoing has
played an important part wherever the doctrine has been applied under
the old statute'2 but perhaps the implied exception of the Schuldt case
will prove more flexible than the statutory exception. In the final ana-
lysis, the answer will depend on whether or not the court feels that the
injustice of denying blamelessly ignorant malpractice victims a remedy
should over ride the policy of repose and protection against stale claims
underlying statutes of limitation.
App. 719, 70 S.E.2d 85 (1952). Recognition of the fraudulent concealment exception
by the Arkansas court is especially interesting in view of the statutory wording which
might easily have precluded its application: "All actions of contract or tort for mal-
practice, error, mistake, or failure to treat or cure, against physicians, surgeons, dentists,
hospitals, and sanatoria, shall be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of
action accrues. The date of the accrual of the cause of action shall be the date of the
wrongful act complained of and to other thne." (Emphasis added.) ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 37-205 (1947).
72. See e.g., Terry v. Davenport, 185 Ind. 561, 112 N.E. 998 (1916) ; Lemster v.
Warner, 137 Ind. 79, 36 N.E. 900 (1894) ; State v. Jackson, 52 Ind. App. 254, 100 N.E.
479 (1913).
